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Abstract
Globalization theorists show how downward pressure to compete and/or
save costs in global markets will lead producers and consumers to source
goods and services in the cheapest and most efficient manner. However,
in certain sectors, such as the defense industry, security concerns and
politics can overshadow economic logic when it comes to making
procurement decisions. These political and security concerns keep the
U.S. defense industry from using the most cost-effective supply chains
and manufacturing centers, whereas in Europe, post-Cold War
socioeconomic and political realities allowed for more transnational
cooperation on defense procurement. Three cases serve to illustrate the
spectrum between autarky and interdependence in defense procurement
and how fundamental political, legal, and structural constraints prevent
the U.S. defense market from becoming fully efficient.
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Introduction   
Globalization describes the world’s economic and social interconnectedness. 
It also describes a world where the boundaries of the state and jurisdictional 
barriers are becoming less significant towards impeding modernity, 
technological innovation, and progressive social change. Globalization 
theorists suggest downward pressure to compete or save costs in global 
markets leads producers and consumers to source goods and services in the 
cheapest and most efficient ways.1 In capitalist market systems, the supply 
chains tend to be buyer-driven; hence, it is in a producer’s best interest to 
establish decentralized production networks and interconnected modes of 
procurement.2 In contrast, the American defense establishment leans 
distinctly towards autarky when it comes to defense spending, leaning on the 
principles of self-sufficiency and independence from the global market.3  
 
Some governments tend to choose autarkic methods when procuring weapons 
because it “ensures security of supply sustains a strong defense industrial 
base and maintains national technological capabilities.”4 In his 1961 farewell 
address, President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously warned against America’s 
growing military-industrial complex, and the rise of “misplaced power” or 
undue influence by the military establishment.5 Yet, a nation’s weapons 
procurement process is much more a result of its structural conditions versus 
a choice of agency. For instance, legal, military, and economic constraints 
inhibit the U.S. defense market from becoming completely globalized, 
interconnected, and efficient. Legal constraints, such as U.S. export 
regulations inhibit the U.S. defense industry and puts pressure on foreign 
companies to comply with U.S. security regulations. From a military 
standpoint, while the United States “is the champion of globalization, yet its 
role as military enforcer is territorially based.”6 Economically, there is little 
                                                 
1 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question (New York: Polity Press, 
1999), 243. 
2 Peter Dicken, “A New Geo-economy,” in The Global Transformations Reader, eds. 
David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998), 305.   
3 Richard Bitzinger, “Globalization in the Post-Cold War Defense Industry: Challenges 
and Opportunities,” in Arming the Future: A Defense Industry for the 21st Century, eds. 
Ann Markusen and Sean Costigan (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, 1999), 305 – 333. 
4 Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of a European Defense,” Political Science Quarterly 121:2 
(2006): 241 – 260. doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2006.tb00571.x. 
5 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” January 17, 1961, available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp. 
6 Robert Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 292. 
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reason for U.S. defense companies to cooperate with foreign companies; U.S. 
companies are self-sufficient and remained profitable without merging or 
creating economies of scale. 
 
In contrast to the Americans, the Europeans have been trading sovereignty 
for interdependence, on military, socio-economic, and political levels since 
World War II. In 1951, France, West Germany, Spain, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg created the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), a precursor to the European Union. The ECSC was a 
supranational organization, designed to create a common market for coal and 
steel. Since its creation, several institutions and intergovernmental 
organizations have come to govern Europe’s political and economic 
landscape. Europe’s integration reflects its liberal-leaning view of 
international relations. Equally, under the conditions of the liberal theories of 
complex-interdependence, “the meaning of sovereignty changes.”7 In the 
same respect, sovereignty “no longer enables states to exert effective 
supremacy over what occurs within their territories.”8  
 
Historical Context   
Throughout modern history, the nation-state has been responsible for its 
arms production. Even many capitalist economies control or completely own 
their defense companies.9 The arms industry has a unique place in the global 
marketplace because industry professionals often see profitability and 
efficiency as less important than the ability to mobilize and secure national 
defense.10  American and European defense industries are no exception to this 
trend. Although their share of the defense market is much larger than other 
nations, they are not immune from the pressures associated with remaining 
profitable yet technologically superior. What is unique about the current 
world military order is that “few states now consider unilateralism or 
neutrality as a credible defense strategy.”11 After World War II, nearly every 
Western nation became a member of a multilateral defense alliance or treaty 
organization; hence, they acquired overlapping security interests. Over the 
past century, these treaty organizations have grown in both size and scope, 
giving way to multilateral decision-making on national security issues.  
                                                 
7 Robert Keohane, “Sovereignty in International Society,” in The Global Transformations 
Reader, eds. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), 155.   
8 Ibid.  
9 Bitzinger, “Globalization,” 306. 
10 Ibid.  
11 David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds., The Global Transformations Reader 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995).    
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After World War II, U.S. forces remained in bases and posts throughout 
Europe as part of a security arrangement to deter Soviet aggression, maintain 
peace, and to aid with post-war reconstruction efforts. Policymakers 
established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 as a 
method of collective defense between the United States, Canada, and several 
Western European countries. Historically, the United States provided the 
bulk of the defense spending for NATO. In the United States, the Defense 
Production Act of 1950 defined the domestic defense industrial base as those 
“domestic sources which are providing, or which would be reasonably 
expected to provide, materials or services to meet national defense 
requirements during peacetime, graduated mobilization, national emergency, 
or war.”12 Throughout the 1940s, 50s and 60s, the U.S.’s domestic defense 
industrial base provided all of the U.S.’s national defense requirements, as 
well as much of Europe’s defense requirements.   
 
United States defense manufacturing peaked in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, along with U.S. manufacturing in general.13 During the 1970s an 
increasing number of manufacturing jobs across the entire U.S. industrial 
base were outsourced to foreign countries. The U.S. defense industry 
remained intact, however, mainly due to Cold War-era armament buildups, 
protectionist policies designed to keep defense jobs from going overseas, and 
a political culture that championed autarky in defense matters. 
 
In 1972, Jonathan Galloway addressed the global implications of defense 
corporations by explaining their driving mechanisms. He demonstrated 
companies would act in their best interests regardless of national pursuits. 
Galloway’s work showed that despite their unique attributes as national 
assets, the driving mechanism behind defense corporations was capitalist in 
nature: they sought financial growth.14 
 
The 1970s also saw the rise of multinational corporations. Joseph Nye 
addressed the difficulty multinational corporations faced given the basic 
political realities that underlid the relationship between corporations and 
                                                 
12 War and National Defense, U.S. Code Title 50 (2011), available at: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title50/html/USCODE-2011-
title50.htm. 
13 Joel Yudken, “Manufacturing Insecurity: America’s Manufacturing Crisis and the 
Erosion of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base,” Cornell University ILR (9/2010), available 
at: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/laborunions/40/. 
14 Jonathan F. Galloway, “The Military-Industrial Linkages of US-Based Multinational 
Corporations” International Studies Quarterly 16:4 (1972): 34–45. doi:10.2307/3013611 
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states. He showed poor states were hesitant to adopt institutional norms and 
practices that had benefited larger, wealthier states and concluded that state 
sovereignty was not threatened by the rise of multinational corporations.15 
Nearly thirty years later, Robert Gilpin explored the tension between national 
sovereignty and the forces of globalization.16 He showed there are limits to 
globalization, and defended the sovereignty of the nation-state. He also 
showed that macroeconomic policies, both fiscal and monetary, kept the 
nation-state a viable entity and in control of economic policy. Likewise, Gilpin 
demonstrated the inherent tension between fixed exchange rates, national 
autonomy, and international capital mobility. The tension between 
multinational defense corporations and nation-states, especially regarding the 
issue of sovereignty, proves to be a key variable when comparing the 
European and the U.S. defense market.  
 
By the late 1970s there was a remarkable rise in overseas trade around the 
globe. Helen Milner proposed that industry’s political demands depend on the 
level of exportation and multinational operations within that industry.17 She 
showed that firms that do not rely on the export of goods or multinational 
operations lean towards protectionist policies. Industries that are more 
internationalized, export more goods, and operate in a multinational 
environment, prefer free-trade policies. Milner concluded that as the world 
becomes interdependent, industry’s political demands would divide along 
import, versus export, concerns.  
 
In the late 1970s and into the Reagan-era defense buildup of the 1980s, there 
was a marked rise in the number of defense companies in the United States, 
as well as foreign companies with U.S. subsidiaries. As the number of foreign 
subsidiaries grew, so did the need for changes in how the U.S. government 
regulated the industry. In 1977, Congress voted the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act into law to address the bribery of foreign officials. In 1993, in a response 
to several national security incidents, Congress established the National 
Industrial Security Program to regulate the U.S. defense industry’s access to 
classified information. Between 1975 and 1991, the United States entered 21 
reciprocal defense memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with NATO 
countries. The MOUs promoted “standardization and interoperability of 
military equipment” as well as cooperation on the reduction of buy-national 
                                                 
15 Joseph Nye, “Multinational Corporations in World Politics” Foreign Affairs 53:1 
(1974): 153–174. doi:10.2307/20039497. 
16 Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic 
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
17 Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of 
International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
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laws and tariffs on imports.18  
 
By the end of the Cold War, the defense market was again in a downturn. 
Pentagon policies of the 1990s forced the U.S. defense industry to consolidate 
into four major defense firms.19 Europe’s defense market also consolidated. 
The ‘new world order’ decreased the demand for military hardware and 
resulted in rising costs of both production and development. The Pentagon’s 
new policies encouraged dual-use development, civil/military integration, 
defense conversion, and arms exports. Globalization offered many benefits to 
the ailing industry, including collaboration on research and development, 
offshore production, access to foreign innovation, and penetration into new 
markets.20 Moreover, the long-term impact of globalization and the changing 
parameters by which nation-states produced and procured weapons made it 
increasingly difficult to “remain on the cutting edge in military technology” 
without internationalization in the production of weaponry.21 While the U.S. 
continued to rely on its own resources for defense, in Europe, an era of 
nationalized defense was “superseded by a sharp increase in licensing, co-
production agreements, joint ventures, corporate alliances and 
subcontracting.”22 Yet the change in Europe’s defense industry was “far from 
being a simple pro rata adjustment of supply to changes in demands arising 
from objective changes in the security environment.”23 The restructuring was 
bound to the “development of institutions, policy paradigms (in both the 
military and the industrial domains) and business networks,” as well the 
complex and interconnected relationships between European companies and 
European governments.24  
 
The post-Cold War downturn in defense spending ebbed again after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. The U.S. military’s intervention in Afghanistan and 
Iraq during the “Global War on Terror” revived defense industries around the 
globe. By 2010 the annual defense budget of the United States approached 
                                                 
18 “Report to Congressional Committees: International Procurement, NATO Allies’ 
Implementation of Reciprocal Defense Agreements,” United States General Accounting 
Office, 1992, available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-92-126.  
19 Ann Markusen and Sean Costigan eds., Arming the Future: A Defense Industry for the 
21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999). 
20 Bitzinger, “Globalization,” 306. 
21 Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, 
and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press, 2007), 6.  
22 Held and McGrew, Global Transformations, 12.  
23 Markusen and Costigan, Arming the Future, 342.  
24 Ibid.  
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$700 billion and annual defense industry profits nearly quadrupled.25 Yet, 
after a decade of fighting in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of forces from 
Iraq, by 2011 the defense industry once again faced a downturn.  
 
Three cases demonstrate the spectrum between interdependence and autarky 
in the defense industry and the fundamental barriers to creating economies of 
scale in the U.S. defense market. The first case shows how political, economic 
and security concerns drive sales (export) regulations in a globalized defense 
market through transnational mergers and acquisitions. The second case 
looks at how those same concerns sway procurement outcomes through co-
development, lobbying efforts, and acquisition regulations. The final case 
looks at how U.S. economic policy and decision-making affects the 
profitability of European defense companies and the security of NATO 
countries.  
 
Case 1: Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions   
After the Cold War, Europe took the first steps in creating fully integrated, 
transnational defense companies. This internationalization of the defense 
industry is significant; it is also representative of the growing integration of 
Europe’s security and work towards military compatibility across members of 
the NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue participants. Europe’s defense 
market also reflects the European Union’s drive towards cooperation at the 
supra-state level, especially after the end of the Cold War and fall of the Soviet 
Union. Their rationale was not only strategic; there was an economic 
motivation towards having a more integrated defense market. Although 
Europe had been cooperating on defense through NATO since the end of 
World War II, it is worth noting that it was not until Europe began integrating 
on a politico-economic level that transnational defense companies began to 
emerge. It is logical to conclude that cooperation on defense in the military 
sector is not a necessarily a precedent for transnational defense cooperation 
in the private sector, however increased economic integration within Europe 
and external competition with the United States did facilitate its growth.  
 
In 2000, European governments merged several defense contractors into a 
single corporate entity. The first phase merged Germany’s Daimler Chrysler 
Aerospace with a Spanish aircraft company, Construcciones Aeronauticas SA 
and later the French company, Aerospatiale-Matra. The merger created the 
                                                 
25 “A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise,” Office of Management 
and Budget (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2009), available at: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2010-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2010-BUD.pdf  
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European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS), later named 
Airbus, the third largest aircraft company in the world. During the same 
period, British, French, Italian, and Spanish missile manufacturers 
consolidated to form the defense company Matra BAe Dynamics Aeropatiale 
(MBDA). The success of EADS and MBDA cannot be understated. The 
defense conglomerations reduced waste from duplicate projects and helped 
set a common framework for technological advances and innovation across 
Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe reduced its employment and 
turnover in the defense sector by almost 50 percent.26  
 
Transnational defense mergers between European and U.S. defense 
companies have not demonstrated the same kind of success as the purely 
European defense mergers. To be more competitive in the U.S. marketplace, 
most European defense companies chose to either acquire small to medium 
sized U.S. defense companies, start joint ventures with U.S. companies, or 
simply open an office in United States. Mergers with large U.S. defense firms, 
on the level that created EADS and MBDA, have proven to be painful and 
costly.   
 
One impediment is that penalties for violating U.S. security rules and 
regulations are severe. Every year dozens defense contractors are caught in 
similar situations; foreign sections of their company violate U.S. security rules 
and regulations and are fined millions of dollars. For instance, the 
Department of Justice caught Pratt & Whitney, the Canadian subsidiary of 
United Technologies, selling sensitive information about attack helicopters to 
China, violating the U.S. Arms Export Control Act.27 Likewise, in 2009, the 
United States suspected the Kuwaiti defense company Agility of contract 
fraud in Iraq, fined, and placed the group on an “Excluded Party List System,” 
a blacklist of firms excluded from doing business with the U.S. government.28 
This forced the United States portion of the Kuwaiti company to close and 
cost the company billions of dollars in lost revenue and fines.  
 
                                                 
26 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Gaining Technological Advantages: Aerospace and Defense 
Insights (New York: PWC, 2011), available at: 
https://www.pwc.com/im/en/publications/assets/shipping-aircraft-space/aerospace-
defence-insights.pdf. 
27 Department of Justice, “United Technologies Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Criminal 
Charges for Helping China Develop New Attack Helicopter,” press release, June 28, 2012, 
available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-technologies-subsidiary-pleads-
guilty-criminal-charges-helping-china-develop-new. 
28 Matthew Bigg, “U.S. Slaps new Fraud Indictment on Kuwait’s Agility,” Reuters, April 
12, 2010, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-agility-charge-
idUSTRE63B5GS20100412.  
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Another example of this phenomenon is the merger between the Italian 
defense conglomerate, Finmeccanica and the U.S. defense electronics and 
firm DRS Technologies. After 9/11, the Italian defense company recognized 
the need to enter the U.S. defense market to stay competitive within the 
industry. 29 In 2007, the two companies began acquisition negotiations.  In 
2008, Finmeccanica completed the purchase of the U.S. defense firm under 
the approval of the U.S. Congress. The U.S. Congress approved the purchase 
under the provision that company officials place DRS’s top-secret defense 
contracts under a Special Security Agreement, which split the company into 
two independent entities. Furthermore, executives placed the most sensitive 
sections of the company under a proxy, which added a duplicate board of 
directors and prevented Finmeccanica from seeing DRS’s classified 
information.  
 
The U.S. Government and Finmeccanica had an unwieldly relationship from 
the beginnings of the merger. Finmeccanica had a supply chain that used 
Chinese manufacturing centers, as well as a robust presence in many places 
the United States found hostile. The Pentagon placed Finmeccanica under 
intense scrutiny for selling arms to the Assad regime in Syria in the years 
prior to their civil war. Furthermore, not long after the merger, a series of 
scandals plagued Finmeccanica, which lead to the resignation of its Chief 
Executive Officer and the president of one of their subsidiary companies.30 
 
Finmeccanica acquired DRS Technologies to leverage the American 
company’s access to U.S. defense contracts and its share of the market, but 
instead the Italian company suffered. The first major setback for the company 
was in 2009, when the U.S. government terminated the helicopter 
procurement designed to replace Marine One from the 2010 U.S. defense 
budget.31 A Finemeccanica subsidiary, AgustaWestand, was working on a joint 
team with Lockheed Martin and Bell Helicopters to produce a variant of 
                                                 
29 Finmeccanica SpA became Leonardo SpA in 2017.  
30 James Mackenzie, “Finmeccanica Sold Radio Equipment to Syria,” Reuters, July 5, 
2012, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-finmeccanica-syria-
idUSBRE86415K20120705; Paulo Biondi and Robin Pomeroy, “Finmeccanica to buy DRS 
Technologies for $5.2 billion,” Reuters, May 12, 2008, available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-drs-finmeccanica-bid-idUSL1226765820080513; 
Marco Bertacche and Sabine Pirone, “Finmeccanica Chairman Resigns Amid Probe as 
Orsi Takes Job,” Bloomberg Business News, December 1, 2011, available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-01/finmeccanica-s-guarguaglini-
faces-showdown-with-board-amid-probe.  
31 Stephen Trimble, “U.S. Navy Terminates VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Contract,” 
Flightglobal, June 2, 2009, available at: 
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-navy-terminates-vh-71-presidential-
helicopter-contract-327241/.  
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AgustaWestland’s 101 helicopter. After U.S. President Barack Obama cited 
cost overruns and procurement process “gone amok,” in April 2009, U.S. 
Navy officials formally cancelled the contract.32 
 
The second major setback for the company came in 2012, when the U.S. Air 
Force grounded its fleet of C-27J “Spartan” aircraft, a modified version of 
Finmecannica’s Aeritalia G222. In February 2012, after the release of the 2011 
Budget Control Act and the effects of sequestration began to take place, the 
Pentagon divested from the C-27J program, citing the need to reduce excess 
capability and protect aircraft with multi-role capabilities.33 Later that year, 
the U.S. Air Force cited mechanical issues in the C-27J’s operating in 
Afghanistan, and grounded the entire fleet.34 In late 2012, citing mechanical 
and maintenance issues, the U.S. Air Force cancelled a separate contract that 
provided modified G222 aircraft for the Afghan Air Force.35 Because of the 
losses and allegations of mismanagement and negligence, the C-27J’s 
manufacturer downsized its presence in North America.36 
 
To complicate matters further, DRS Technologies operated under a 
completely different board of directors which isolated the company from 
Finmeccanica’s decision-making apparatus. The company faced intense 
scrutiny on the initial acquisition, and due to the rigor of the contracting 
process, subsequent U.S. contracts proved extremely difficult for the company 
to win. Finmeccanica purchased DRS Technologies in 2008 for $5.2 billion, 
but after being hit by a sharp decline defense spending several contact losses, 
it lost 40 percent of its value in just seven years.37 
                                                 
32 Ross Colvin, “Obama says U.S. Helicopter Project Costs ‘Gone Amok,’” Reuters, 
February 23, 2009, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-weapons-
idUSTRE51M6UM20090224. 
33 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Budget, Priorities and Choices (Washington, 
D.C.:  January 2012), available at: 
http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Budget_Priorities.pdf. 
34 Richard Dudley, “U.S. Air Force Grounds C-27J Fleet Due to Flight Control Failure,” 
Defense Update, July 15, 2012, available at: http://defense-update.com/20120715_us-
air-force-grounds-c-27j-fleet-due-to-flight-control-failure.html 
35 Tony Osborne and Amy Butler, “USAF Halts Troubled Afghan Transport Support 
Deal,” Aviation Week Network, January 4, 2013, available at: 
http://aviationweek.com/awin/usaf-halts-troubled-afghan-transport-deal.  
36 Marcus Weisgerber, “Alenia Gutting North American Business Unit, Fires CEO,” 
DefenseNews, February 12, 2013, available at: http://www.defense-
aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/142645/alenia-guts-us-unit%2C-fires-ceo-after-
losing-contracts.html. 
37 Pamela Barbaglia and Mike Stone, “Finmeccanica Invites Bids for DRS Assets as 
Prelude to Possible Sale–Sources,” Reuters, March 3, 2015, available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/finmeccanica-equity-drs-technologies-
idUSL5N0W44E120150303. 
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Case 2: Defense Procurement in a Globalized Market  
After the Cold War, European Member States agreed on the need to foster, 
develop, and sustain a European Defense, Technological, and Industrial Base 
(EDTIB) that is capability driven, competent, and competitive. To achieve this 
objective, Member States elected to use different tools, in conformity with 
European Community law, aiming at a truly European defense equipment 
market and a level playing field at both European and global levels.  To 
achieve that objective, the European Parliament established a legislative 
framework, which set the procedures for awarding defense contracts and the 
coordination of procurement timelines.38 The combination of a common 
industrial base, regulatory framework, and a decline in absolute defense 
spending created opportunities to “reallocate defense resources.”39 
 
Unlike the Europeans, whose procurement regulations are standardized 
across the European defense market, foreign defense companies operating in 
the United States are subject to a host of changing rules and regulations as 
well as protectionist procurement practices. Aside from political concerns 
about domestic jobs, interoperability and foreign supply-chains are also key 
issues. Europe has standardized many of its equipment regulations, whereas 
U.S. defense manufacturing only reflects interoperability with American-
made equipment.   
 
Ideally, procurement officials make contract awards through a competitive 
process that rewards the lowest priced, technically acceptable bids. Yet, 
political challenges and litigation prolong the procurement process, which 
hurts the U.S. government’s readiness and efficacy. The politicization of the 
U.S. defense industry can also inhibit competition from foreign firms. In 
1990, Department of Defense officials estimated that only 44 percent of 
defense procurement in the United States was open to foreign competition.40 
Despite two decades of integration in Europe, market access in the United 
States is still a contentious issue. In 2011, The Department of Defense had a 
                                                 
38 “EU Directive 2009/81/EC,” Official Journal of the European Union, 2009, available 
at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:216:0076:0136:en:PDF  
39 Joachim Hofbauer, Roy Levy, and Gregory Sanders, “European Defense Trends: 
Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base,” (Washington, D.C.: Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), available at: 
http://www.csis.org/files/publication/101025_EuroDefenseTrends_web.pdf. 
40 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “International Procurement: NATO Allies' 
Implementation of Reciprocal Defense Agreements, ” March 18, 1992, available at: 
http://gao.gov/products/NSIAD-92-126. 
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$137.5 billion budget for procurement.41 Of the fifteen largest programs, each 
over $1.5 billion, only one had a foreign defense contractor on the payroll.42 
The Buy-American Act and legislation such as the Berry Amendment, which 
mandates the DOD must procure certain defense articles and goods from 
American sources, makes it extremely difficult for European companies to 
compete for U.S. Government contracts.43  
 
A prime example of the litigations challenges facing U.S. defense procurement 
agencies, as well as European defense companies, was the U.S. Air Force’s 
competition for its Stratotanker replacement. In 2006, the U.S. Air Force 
released request for proposal (RFP) to replace aging fleet of KC-135 
Stratotankers. Initially, competitors included the Seattle-based Boeing 
aerospace company and a Northrop Grumman/EADS (U.S./pan-European) 
team.  
 
After the companies submitted their proposals, the U.S. Air Force 
procurement division announced the Northrop Grumman/EADS team as the 
winner. Boeing protested the bid to the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), which put the bid into a litigation phase. It is common for 
defense companies to protest bid decisions, but the GAO rarely upholds 
protests.44 Due to the size and scope of the contract, the media gave quite a bit 
of attention to Boeing’s protest. The GAO upheld Boeing’s protest and 
demanded a second competition.  
 
During the initial phase of the second competition, the U.S. Air Force 
modified the 373 requirements for the Stratotanker. Boeing, the Northrop 
Grumman/EADS team, and a surprise bidder, U.S. Aerospace/Antonov (U.S.-
                                                 
41 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “FY 2011 DoD Agency Financial 
Report (AFR)/DoD Performance and Accountability Report (PAR),” (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2012), available at: 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/afr/fy2011/DoD_FY11_Agency
_Financial_Report.pdf. 
42 See: “Fiscal year 2011 Budget Request: Procurement Programs,” FY2011 President’s 
Budget (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), available at http:// 
archive.defense.gov/news/d2010rolloutbrief1.pdf; United States Department of Defense 
FY 2012 Budget Request (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011), available 
at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41861.pdf; Rolls Royce is a prime contractor on the 
F-35 Lightning II program. 
43 See: Buy American Act of 1933 41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8303; The Berry Amendment of 1941 
10 U.S.C. § 2533a.  
44 Moshe Schwartz and Kate Manuel, “GAO Bid Protests: Trends and Analysis,” 
Congressional Research Service, July 21, 2015, available at: 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40227.pdf; per the CRS report, from FY2001-2008 
the GAO sustained protests in 22 percent of their opinions and from FY2009-2014 it 
dropped to 17 percent. 
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Ukrainian) each submitted bids. In one of the most intense battles for a U.S. 
Government contract in the history of defense contracting, Boeing launched 
an unprecedented effort to oust the Northrop Grumman/ EADS team. This 
effort included a lobbying campaign with Congressmen whose congressional 
districts were to be affected by the outcome of the contract decision as well as 
an aggressive marketing campaign in Washington D.C.-metropolitan area. In 
response, Northrop Grumman and EADS launched their own counter-
campaign. Both EADS and Boeing faced off on the issue of how many jobs 
were to be sent overseas. Boeing contended that hundreds of U.S. 
manufacturing jobs could be lost if a foreign company were to win the 
contract. The claims were not completely true: although a pan-European 
company, EADS had a U.S. subsidiary owned and operated by Americans 
citizens. The EADS plan included using that company for the bulk of the labor 
on the Stratotanker contract.  
 
From a security standpoint, it was difficult for the Pentagon to accept the U.S. 
Aerospace/Antonov team as a serious competitor because Antonov was also a 
major supplier to the Russian military. The U.S. Air Force eliminated the 
Aerospace/Antonov team from competition for submitting their bid after the 
due date. The U.S. Aerospace/Antonov team protested that decision, but the 
GAO dismissed protest. In the year before announcing the Stratotanker 
winner, Boeing spent nearly $18 million in lobbying Congress on the 
procurement, over five times what EADS spent during the same period.45 Five 
years after the U.S. Air Force released the original RFP, they selected Boeing 
as the winner. Defense analysts suggested Boeing won by bidding the contract 
at a loss.46 The Stratotanker case not only demonstrates the power of 
protectionist policies, but also the barriers to entry in this competitive market.  
 
Case 3: Global Repercussions  
Over the last thirty years, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
and the World Trade Organization have “governed” the process of 
globalization. Neoliberal economic reforms gained momentum as an 
orientation towards free market policies during the late 1980s through 2000 
under the patronage of the Washington Consensus, which produced a set of 
                                                 
45 Donna Casata, “Boeing, EADS Spend Millions on Tanker Dogfight,” Seattle Times, 
February 21, 2011, available at: http://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-eads-
spend-millions-on-tanker-dogfight/; per Congressional sources, Boeing spent $17.9M in 
lobbying in FY2010, where EADS spent $3M; Public Relations specialists show Boeing 
spent $5M in print advertising compared to EADS’ $1.7M.  
46 Loren Thompson, “How Boeing Won the Tanker War,” Forbes, February 28, 2011, 
available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/02/28/how-boeing-won-the-
tanker-war/. 
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policy and economic actions, largely based on Keynesian economic principles. 
If taken at an early stage of democratic transition, in theory the principles 
enable a graceful progression into the world economy. The principles contain 
elements of macroeconomic reform (liberalization, stabilization, and fiscal 
austerity) and stress the importance of bringing down inflation and 
establishing economic growth. In addition, they incorporate elements of 
microeconomic reform such as privatization, and Foreign Direct Investment, 
as well as structural reforms.47 The reforms provide fiscal austerity, rapid 
privatization, and market liberalization, but complexities in the international 
system can also cause hyperinflation, loose monetary policy, high interest 
rates, and unemployment.48 In actuality, many of the reforms pushed 
“premature capital market liberalization” and failed to guide several countries 
in their transition to a market economy.49  
 
Many European defense companies directly benefit from U.S. defense policy. 
British Aerospace and Electronics, Rolls Royce, Saab Defense, the French 
company Thales, EADS, and the Italian conglomerate Leonardo each directly 
profit from the U.S. defense market, and saw their bottom lines increase 
during the mid-2000s due to large contracts in Iraq, Afghanistan, other 
Overseas Contingency Operations, as well as modernization efforts by the 
U.S. military.50 The consequences of complex interdependence have had far-
reaching, global implications. For instance, the consequences of failed U.S. 
economic policy do not only hurt developing countries, they also affect 
Europe.  
 
As an example, from 2010 to 2016, the United States saw a sharp decrease in 
its share of global defense spending. In 2010, the United States comprised 46 
percent of total global defense spending (1.71 trillion), whereas in 2015 the 
United States only comprised 36 percent of the total global defense spending 
(1.65 trillion).51 U.S. Congress’s struggle to balance the budget in 2012 
provides one example of the unintended consequences stemming from U.S. 
economic policy.  The Budget Control Act of 2011 outlined the sequestration 
as an austerity measure designed to cut an additional $500 billion from the 
defense budget over a 10-year period. The measure implemented deep cuts 
                                                 
47 Robert Looney, “Banking on Baghdad: Financial Change in Postwar Iraq,” Strategic 
Insights 3:5 (2004): 12-19, available at: 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/11285/looneyMay04.pdf?sequence=1.    
48Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 54.   
49 Ibid.  
50 Formerly known as Finmeccanica SpA.  
51 IHS Aerospace, Defence and Security, Jane’s Defence Budgets, Annual Report 2015,  
December 17, 2015, 7. 
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into all major defense programs. Sequestration combined with the post-2009 
European debt crisis had a major impact on NATO’s readiness, forcing the 
alliance to restructure is military priorities to accommodate new fiscal 
realities. The move meant security and more vulnerability of European 
nations, which account for less than 25 percent of NATO’s overall budget and 
manpower.52 NATO’s overall growth decreased for five years: From 2011 
through 2015, and only increased in 2016 because of challenges “posed by 
[the Islamic State] and Russia.”53 
 
Conclusion  
Over time, Nye’s liberal vision for international world order became the 
reality in Europe, whereas in the United States it became a reflection of 
Gilpin’s realist worldview. While Europe turned out to be more reliant on its 
multinational environment, the U.S. defense industry leaned towards 
protectionism. Europe’s military and defense integration began after World 
War II, but became much more apparent after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. During the Cold War, Europe benefited from the NATO alliance 
structure and took advantage of the security offered by the U.S. military to 
work on a common framework for defense. To compete with the United 
States, the Europeans had to consolidate its defense market. While the 
Americans and the Europeans have cooperated on defense efforts, the 
common framework of the European Community enabled Europe’s defense 
companies the legal means to pursue common objectives. Europe’s defense 
industry reflects a liberal world view- one governed through cooperation, 
interdependence, international laws, institutions, as well as globalization 
within the European defense market. To the contrary, the U.S. defense 
industry has remained autarkical, resistant to the forces of globalization, and 
as a result, distinctly realist.  
 
Given the volume of the United States’ share of the global defense budget, it is 
likely that U.S. defense spending will contribute to Europe’s ebbs and flows in 
the market. For instance, 2014 was the “first year since 2010 that global 
[defense] expenditure rose, largely due to a slowdown of the rate of decrease 
in [U.S. defense] spending.”54 In real terms, analysts project growth among 
                                                 
52 Clara O’Donnell, ed. The Impact of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest 
Members (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2012) available at: 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/military-spending-nato-
odonnell-pdf.pdf.  
53 IHS Aerospace, Defence and Security, Jane’s Defence Budgets, Annual Report 2015 
(December 17, 2015), 62. 
54 Ibid., 61.  
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NATO’s European members will remain steady for the remainder of the 
decade, with “the U.S. acting as a drag on budgetary trends for the alliance.”55 
When U.S. defense sequestration ends, it is likely NATO’s (and Europe’s) 
defense growth outlook will improve. 
 
During the early 1990s, the United States’ entry into the North American Free 
Trade Agreement signaled the United States was moving towards more 
integration and economic cooperation. If Europe becomes the model for 
economic and defense integration in the private sector; it is possible that 
parallel trends could be seen in North America at some point, despite decades 
of American hegemony in the defense market. The problem is American 
structural constraints, as well as a political culture that demands autarky, 
makes it difficult for true integration to develop. Security concerns from rogue 
states and arms proliferation also prevent U.S. companies from accepting the 
full benefits of a globalized market. Furthermore, from an economic 
standpoint, a significant threat to United States supremacy in the 
international arms market does not exist. If a transnational defense 
conglomeration were to emerge between the United States and Europe, it 
would most likely be in response to a threat from outside NATO, not from the 
fiscal benefit derived from economies of scale. Therefore, over time, U.S. 
defense manufacturers (and therefore U.S. government procurement 
agencies) are likely face increasing costs as the forces of globalization drive 
manufacturing and production to developing countries. Yet, the U.S. defense 
industry will only outsource manufacturing and production if companies 
globalized defense market can compete with a much more cost-effective and 
efficient product.  
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